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Abstract 
The Department of Defense is increasingly involved in missions such 
as post-war stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief, and building the capacity of partner 
nations. An international, knowledge-sharing research program 
called STAR-TIDES examines innovative approaches to public-
private collaboration and “whole-of-government” solutions to 
provide affordable, sustainable support to stressed populations in 
these environments. STAR-TIDES encourages unity of effort among 
diverse organizations where there is no unity of command. It 
addresses problems through seven broad action areas: 
- Gather, share, and evaluate information about capabilities 
- Develop social networks and build trust 
- Align policy, doctrine and field operating procedures 
- Resolve legal and regulatory constraints 
- Address resource requirements 
- Train, exercise and educate, and 
- Integrate with associated activities. 
Implementing these measures requires crosscutting changes among 
people, processes, operations, and technology in complex, civil-
military environments that are every bit as transformational as high-
end warfare initiatives. STAR-TIDES approaches have been 
examined extensively in terrestrial contingencies, but not yet in 
maritime ones. This paper focuses on their application to maritime 
environments and their effects on the Sea Services.  
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Introduction 
ational security transformation seeks major advances in 
capabilities for defense, diplomacy, and development through 
changes in people, processes, organizations, and technology. It 
is an ongoing process, not a finite event. This essay examines some 
aspects of transformation by investigating interactions between two 
initiatives, the 2007 Maritime Strategy and a research project called 
STAR-TIDES.1 It emphasizes activities that involve more than one of 
the transformation categories, such as how people interact with 
processes, or technology with organizations. 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was issued 
jointly by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard in October 
2007.2 It is a seminal document and a significant departure from past 
approaches. The new Maritime Strategy moves beyond traditional 
naval roles such as power projection, sea control, strategic deterrence, 
and forward presence to include capabilities like maritime security, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. This embraces evolving 
notions of cooperative security,3 which the strategy explores in depth, 
promoting interoperability and engagement with diverse partners.  
One of the strategy’s central tenets is that “Preventing wars is as 
important as winning wars” which reflects the fact that the Department 
of Defense (DOD) is increasingly involved in missions such as postwar 
stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 
                                                     
1 TIDES stands for Transformative Innovation for Development and 
Emergency Support. TIDES is part of a broader effort, Sustainable 
Technologies, Accelerated Research, or STAR. Hence, STAR-TIDES. 
2 Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (2007), Introduction. 
3 See, for example, Commander, U.S. European Command and 
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Military Contribution to 
Cooperative Security, Joint Operating Concept, version 1.0, September 19, 
2008. It defines cooperative security as, “The set of continuous, long term, 
integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and 
international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or 
enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations 
when crises occur.” A more theoretical treatment is provided by Michael 
Mihalka, “Cooperative Security in the 21st Century,” The Quarterly Journal 
2005(Winter):113–122. 
N 
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and building the capacity of partner nations. It also mirrors the 
profound changes that have taken place in U.S. national security 
strategy, policy, and doctrine since 2004.4 
The new Maritime Strategy is complemented by an innovative, 
international social network focused on knowledge-sharing that is part 
of the STAR-TIDES project.5 The project examines transformational 
approaches to public–private collaboration, whole-of-government 
solutions, and transnational engagement. It is pioneering new forms of 
global partnership, with a goal of providing sustainable, affordable 
support to stressed populations in postwar, postdisaster, or 
impoverished environments. STAR-TIDES encourages unity of effort 
among diverse organizations where there is no unity of command. 
Combining distributed organizations and new institutional approaches 
to cooperative security can improve effectiveness in complex, civil–
military environments. Such efforts may be every bit as 
transformational in the prevention of war as advanced research and 
development and high-performance systems procurement are in the 
preparation for combat operations.  
STAR-TIDES approaches have been examined extensively in 
terrestrial contingencies,6 but not yet in maritime ones. This essay thus 
focuses on the approaches’ applicability to maritime environments, 
their transformational aspects, and their effects on the Sea Services. It 
links theory and practice to highlight ways in which the new Maritime 
Strategy can flourish in the context of diverse, crosscutting initiatives 
that link people, processes, organizations, and technology in novel 
ways.  
                                                     
4 The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy address 
complex operations and engagement with civilians; DOD Instruction 3000.05 
focuses on Stability Operations; Army Field Manuals 3-0 (Operations), 3-07 
(Stability Operations) and 3-24 (Counterinsurgency, which also is Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publications 3-33.5) provide Service-level doctrine on 
these types of situations. 
5 TIDES = Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency 
Support. It is part of the broader effort called STAR (Sustainable 
Technologies, Accelerated Research). 
6 See, for example, Linton Wells II et al., STAR-TIDES and Starfish 
Networks: Supporting Stressed Populations with Distributed Talent (Center 
for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizon, 2009, 
forthcoming). 
 90  •  Wells and Christman
 
The Maritime Strategy 
This essay addresses two questions: How can the distributed 
organizational structures represented by STAR-TIDES help meet the 
goals of the Maritime Strategy? And how are these structures 
transformational?7 Can examples of cooperative security with 
nontraditional partners be used to illustrate links between new 
organizational forms and the goals of the Maritime Strategy? 
The Maritime Strategy is shaped by the proximity of large 
populations to the coast worldwide, along with disruptive factors such 
as social instability, the effects of climate change, mass 
communications that focus on human suffering, and extremist and 
criminal elements that arise as a result of instability. To counter these 
emerging threats, the Maritime Strategy seeks to integrate sea power 
with: 
other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and 
allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to 
protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to 
protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which 
we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and 
winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding 
commitment to preventing war. 
This requires global cooperative engagements among governments, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations 
(like the United Nations), and the private sector, all partners with whom 
STAR-TIDES seeks to engage as well. The Maritime Strategy’s focus 
on reducing the causes of instability also aligns with STAR-TIDES’ 
focus on reducing stress on populations. 
This emphasis on interdependency—a recurring theme of the 
Maritime Strategy—represents a major conceptual change from the 
way sea power was envisioned only a few years ago. It occurs within 
an emerging cooperative security concept that moves beyond 
deterrence based on conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities 
as the primary means of preventing war. Although by no means 
abandoning the need for decisive combat power, the strategy 
recognizes that U.S. security interests are linked with those of other 
                                                     
7 The authors wish to thank Ivan Labra, a research associate at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, for posing the issue in this insightful way and for his 
thoughts in addressing it. 
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nations and emphasizes the importance of engaging effectively with the 
world’s interlocking “networks of trade, finance, information, law, 
people and governance.” It fosters asymmetrical global partnerships to 
address emerging challenges to human security posed by globalization 
and climate change.8  
The U.S. approach is not unique, however, as innovative navies 
around the world are focused on similar transformations. Rear Admiral 
Tan Kai Hoe, Chief of Staff of the Singapore Navy, outlines the issues 
well:9 
While different navies may face different specific challenges, there 
are some global trends which are key drivers of transformation. Chief 
amongst these is the uncertain global environment, with an increase 
in new security threats and security concerns . . . in addition to 
fulfilling their traditional roles of ensuring good order at sea and 
protecting maritime commerce, [navies] are also expected to 
contribute towards the maintenance of global security through 
ensuring maritime security against terrorism, or by standing ready to 
provide relief to natural disasters. [Navies also] must continue to 
hone a sharp edge in conventional war fighting to deter aggression, 
and to win in conflicts if necessary. [T]hey have to develop new 
capabilities, structures and processes to meet the broadened range of 
new and existing operational demands. 
A key tenet of the Maritime Strategy is to foster cooperative 
relationships over time, which means the Sea Services must develop 
more expertise in the cultures, histories, and languages of international 
partners. They also must coordinate better with other U.S. armed forces 
and government agencies. As the strategy says:  
Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, 
trust and cooperation cannot be surged.10 They must be built over 
                                                     
8 The Maritime Strategy relies on six core capabilities: forward presence, 
deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster response. 
9 Tan Kai Hoe, RADM, “Naval Transformation: Progress, Prospects and 
People,” Pointer: Singapore: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 
2008;34(2):6. It is noteworthy that Singapore entrusts roughly 1 percent of its 
defense budget to the “Future Systems Architect,” charged with developing 
transformational concepts. 
10 STAR-TIDES-related research into human interoperability is looking at 
ways to accelerate trust-building across different cultures. It clearly is better if 
trust has been built and social networks developed before a crisis emerges, but 
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time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously 
considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.  
Forward maritime deployments help promote sustained 
relationships with partners, enable rapid responses after disasters, and 
help mitigate disruptions or keep them localized. 
STAR-TIDES and the Maritime Strategy: Three 
Dimensions of Interaction 
STAR-TIDES can complement the Maritime Strategy by helping to 
create more stable environments and reduce preconditions for 
conflict.11  
In lieu of the deployable, expensive, and hard-to-sustain types of 
equipment that DOD often brings to these contingencies, STAR-TIDES 
focuses on crosscutting, whole systems12 approaches to seven types of 
infrastructures: shelter, water, power, integrated combustion and solar 
cooking, cooling/lighting/heating, sanitation, and information and 
communications technologies. STAR-TIDES supports the rapid 
dissemination and adaption of knowledge developed in these domains 
though the use of online collaborative capabilities and the creation and 
maintenance of publicly available knowledge repositories through its 
Web presence at http://www.star-tides.net. 
The STAR-TIDES concept cultivates interactions among 
nontraditional partners. Joining STAR-TIDES’ adaptive capabilities to 
the capacity of our maritime organizations and their international 
                                                                                                                    
it may be possible to build trust more quickly than expected, even under 
stressed conditions. Research is ongoing. 
11 Three specific areas of emphasis outlined in the Maritime Strategy lend 
themselves to STAR-TIDES-like interactions: improve integration and 
interoperability, enhance awareness, and prepare our people. In addition, the 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), signed in January 2009 by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies four basic categories of 
military activity for the Joint Force in 2016 to 2028: combat, security, 
engagement, and relief and reconstruction. STAR-TIDES contributes directly 
to the last two categories and indirectly to setting the conditions for security. 
12 “Whole systems” in this context means looking at approaches among 
different infrastructures to see how they can complement each other. For 
example, heat from solar cooking can purify water and also heat rocks or 
bricks to help avoid pulmonary and eye diseases from having to burn fires 
inside shelters.  
 Transformational Initiatives in Civil-Military Operations  •  93 
partners could be transformative—a “non-force” multiplier, if you will. 
It helps establish the conditions for peace.  
The transformational nature of STAR-TIDES’ organizational 
construct lies in its ability to access distributed talent. It leverages new 
technologies to create on-demand, resilient capabilities that are 
focused, yet broadly accessible and comprehensive. Drawing on this, 
STAR-TIDES can interact with traditional maritime approaches along 
three dimensions: 
• provide crosscutting analyses of capabilities for distressed 
populations that apply to the seven core TIDES infrastructure 
areas; 
• promote rapid process innovation to improve ways of doing 
business in such areas as unclassified information sharing; and 
• assist in developing and implementing partner-centric 
solutions through an agile planning process that engages 
public–private, whole-of-government, and international 
partners. This approach contributes to unity of effort among 
diverse organizations that will not subordinate themselves to a 
single chain of command. 
The global talent accessed by the STAR-TIDES network has helped 
address real-world problems such as stabilization and reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery (HA/DR) in 
tropical regions such as Cyclone Nargis relief in Myanmar, and 
building the capacity of partner nations in Africa. It also has 
contributed to disaster response within North America by exploring 
shelter solutions for the Canadian Arctic and providing aid to first 
responders in the United States. 
Implementing Interactions 
Innovation and Scenario Planning for “Wicked Problems.” In 
their classic 1973 treatise, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber introduced 
the concept of “wicked” problems to social planning, contrasting 
“wicked” problems with the relatively “tame” and soluble problems 
found in mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving.13 The phrase evokes a 
                                                     
13 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning,” Policy Sciences, 1973;4:155–169 [reprinted in N. Cross (ed.), 
Developments in Design Methodology (Chichester: J. Wiley & Sons, 1984), 
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problem thought to be difficult or impossible to solve because of 
incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often 
hard to recognize. Further, because of complex interdependencies, the 
effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create 
other problems. For DOD, the ability to support the types of 
contingencies posed by the challenges of globalization, instability, and 
insecurity from whatever cause is often impeded by limited trust and 
cooperation with civil-military mission partners,14 limited abilities to 
share information and situational awareness, and a lack of suitable, 
low-cost, support infrastructures. When all three shortfalls are present, 
the potential for wicked problems is very high. 
STAR-TIDES can help the Maritime Strategy address such 
problems. In complex operations, the United States cannot achieve the 
social, political, and economic goals for which its military forces have 
been committed unless it can engage effectively with the populations it 
is trying to influence. These include local governments, businesses, and 
members of civil society.15 These interactions typically involve 
complex relationships that usually include concurrent mixes of 
collaboration, competition, and conflict.16 The ability to share 
unclassified information is particularly important, as is being able to 
reach beyond the boundaries of joint military forces and work 
effectively across other organizational membranes.17 Unclassified 
                                                                                                                    
135–44]. The definition of a wicked problem is available online at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem. 
14 Civil-military mission partners include other U.S. Government agencies, 
international organizations; NGOs; state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments; indigenous security services; and others (including commercial 
firms and individuals as appropriate) who are directly contributing to the 
ongoing mission. Some NGOs object to the term “partner” and prefer less 
binding terms like “participant.” Private volunteer organizations, largely made 
up of volunteers, are making increasingly important contributions in complex 
operations. 
15 See, for example, Mark Gerencser et al., Megacommunities (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
16 See “Converging, Combining, Emerging,” the Executive Summary of 
Highlands Forum XXXII, May 29–31, 2007. Available at 
https://www.hlforum.com/conferences. 
17 See Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Cronin, Civilian Surge: The Key to 
Complex Operations—A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2008). See especially chapter 13, “Engaging with 
Local Actors.” 
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situational awareness and the communications networks to share it are 
not mere technical adjuncts to combat operations or major HA/DR 
deliverables such as food, shelter, water, and security. They are the 
critical enablers of everything else that happens.  
STAR-TIDES brings knowledge-sharing and cost-effective 
infrastructures, but it also includes a planning process that examines 
scenarios through a structured, multistep approach. The goals of this 
approach are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, 
government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, 
extend the military’s ability to work with civilians in such situations, 
and economize by identifying low-cost logistic solutions and 
rationalizing supply chains. The scenarios help tie the diverse pieces 
together. 
There is a long tradition of scenario planning within the military, 
and especially the Navy, as generations of participants in the Naval 
War College’s Global war game may attest. Likewise, the literature of 
scenario-based planning is wide-ranging and has been shaped by 
experience in both government and the private sector. Years ago, Pierre 
Wack wrote in the Harvard Business Review:18 
Scenarios deal with two worlds; the world of facts and the world of 
perceptions. They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside 
the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and 
transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions. 
This transformation process is not trivial—more often than not it 
does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that 
generates a heartfelt “Aha” … and leads to strategic insights beyond 
the mind’s reach. 
STAR-TIDES emphasizes the needs of affected people “on the 
ground” who will need to accept, implement, and sustain the solutions. 
For the purposes of the Maritime Strategy, the global community of 
STAR-TIDES contributors, plus the “bottom-up” focus, can provide 
key insights for addressing many of the unique wicked problems 
inherent in complex, multisector interactions. Moreover, the inclusion 
of local communities of business, government, and civil society is an 
important link between strategy and task in support of the cooperative 
                                                     
18 Pierre Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” Harvard Business 
Review 1985(November–December):140. The authors thank Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty member Marc Ventresca for bringing this article 
to our attention. 
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security agenda. These can combine to provide the “Aha” experience 
mentioned by Pierre Wack. 
Some examples provide clarification. The ones below are built 
around an HA/DR scenario in the Western Pacific. 
The first step is for planners, supported by the STAR-TIDES 
network, to postulate the desired end state and success metrics and to 
build paths to them from the initial scenario conditions. (How long 
should people stay in temporary shelters? How will first responders 
reach the victims?) 
Then, drawing on the information in the STAR-TIDES knowledge 
repository, and especially by “pulsing” the far-flung STAR-TIDES 
network for ideas, “crosscutting” solution sets can be postulated (mixes 
of shelter, water, power, etc.) that can be tailored to the needs of the 
scenario. (Which combinations of shelter, water, power, cooking, etc. 
would be likely to work best in Western Pacific environments in the 
rainy season and afterward?) Not all solutions suit all scenarios. 
Building partner nation capacity to stabilize southern archipelagos calls 
for different answers (and probably staffing) than supporting mountain 
earthquake victims in winter. 
The most important action is to identify the local, multisector 
coalition members who will have to live with and sustain the solutions 
on the ground, and then engage them effectively. (What part of the 
local government performs FEMA–like functions? What local 
languages are involved? How do U.S. forces, aid agencies like USAID, 
the United Nations, and others interact with them?) Social network 
development and trust building must be combined with bottom-up 
engagement that focuses on the stressed populations in their 
environments and also informs top-down project managers. Human 
interoperability must be encouraged not just among people, but also in 
institution building and in interactions with available equipment. 
The next step is to refine the scenarios, desired end states, metrics, 
and solution sets in concert with the appropriate local coalition leaders, 
U.S. entities, and international players. For example, the number of 
projected homeless may need to be adjusted based on local knowledge, 
and the postulated infrastructure sets may need to be tailored to local 
preferences. 
Sources of supply need to be identified for the proposed solutions. 
There are four main options: government stockpiles or contracts, non–
U.S. Government stockpiles or contracts, commercial supply chain—
indigenous and international, and empowered citizens (if only everyone 
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had had three days worth of food and water before Hurricane Katrina). 
As an example of ways to empower civilians, STAR-TIDES is working 
with computer gamers and the One Laptop Per Child project to write 
games that could teach children how to prepare themselves and their 
families better for disasters and how to respond after a disaster hits. 
Field operating procedures (including military tactics, techniques 
and procedures) need to be aligned with policies and doctrine to help 
people on the ground understand the limits of what can and cannot be 
shared, what approvals are needed, and so on to work well together. 
The United States now has fairly comprehensive policy and doctrine 
about complex operations, but until they are converted into tactical 
guidance that can be implemented by those in the arena, the results on 
the ground will be disappointing. 
Ideally, these steps will have been taken well in advance of a crisis, 
and thus form the basis for planning and consequence mitigation.19 
Because information will be widely shared via the STAR-TIDES and 
related Web sites, others can benefit from lessons learned from any one 
scenario and apply them to their own situations. Planners in all 
complex contingencies need to consider what alternatives to traditional 
command and control20 need to be designed and implemented for 
disparate stakeholders in these environments.21 To let diverse 
organizations “focus” on problems and develop a shared situational 
                                                     
19 One example is a pending technology demonstration project called 
PEAK (Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits). In conjunction with 
partner nations, kits will be developed that can support U.S. and partner 
nations in building the capacity of the partner nations for scenarios of interest 
to them. These kits will be tailored to local needs and prepositioned in their 
areas. This work is sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command. 
20 Traditional military command and control typically will not work with 
civil–military mission partners in complex operations, as nongovernmental 
organizations, civilian agencies, police forces, and so on usually will not 
subordinate themselves to military command. This is one reason why it is 
important to focus on how to achieve unity of effort when there is no unity of 
command.  
21 David S. Alberts, “Agility, Focus and Convergence, The Future of 
Command and Control,” The International C2 Journal 2007;1:1–30. This 
seminal paper addresses the need, in any contingency, to design structures that 
focus on the problem, are agile enough to meet the needs of the situation, and 
can converge the resources to get the job done. NATO is reaching similar 
conclusions in its reviews of network-enabled capabilities C2 Maturity 
Models. 
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awareness of what’s going on, network-enabled capabilities are 
essential that link as many participants as possible. In turn, this requires 
an underlying data strategy that allows all information on the network 
to be discoverable, accessible, and understandable. The community of 
interest for Maritime Domain Awareness is doing this very effectively.  
Legal and Regulatory Issues. U.S. Government accountability 
rules limit DOD’s ability to transfer goods and services bought with 
one kind of funds to other areas under different circumstances. For 
example, it is hard to leave behind military equipment for disaster 
victims. Both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES need to 
understand these constraints and address them as appropriate. In 
addition to general rules on equipment transfer, planners must 
understand what regulatory and other issues must be addressed in 
particular scenarios (customs and border clearance, or export controls, 
for example). 
The distributed nature of modern information sharing raises an 
important question that will have to be answered by governments and 
other organizations in the next few years. That involves the oversight of 
and accountability in so-called covenantal arrangements. There are 
well-established procedures for managing accountability and oversight 
in command relationships and in contractual relationships, but there are 
few models for inspectors general and accountability offices to use 
when the arrangements are made by covenant (e.g., handshakes, 
distributed data storage outside a firewall like Google Docs, 
agreements among disparate cultures—“three cups of tea,” etc.). 22 
Many activities in complex civil–military operations, Web 2.0 
environments, and other situations in which there is no unity of 
command will have to rely on covenants. This is an important issue that 
will have to be addressed from many standpoints—managerial, policy, 
legal, and accounting. Both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES 
efforts to promote partnerships among diverse organizations will have 
to engage here as well. 
Training, Exercising, and Education. A key part of any program 
is to train the trainers first, and then those who will use the 
infrastructures in the field. Rotary Clubs do an excellent job of this in 
                                                     
22 The authors are indebted to Mr. Ken Hamilton of the KENTIA 
Management Group for this insight. 
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supporting deployments of the ShelterBox disaster relief kit.23 
ShelterBox will deploy a team of trainers who speak the local language 
to teach local Rotarians how to set up the tents and use the shelter box 
equipment, so that they in turn can train survivors. Exercise programs 
are needed to practice, refine, and revisit issues; incorporate lessons 
learned; and change behaviors. Some broadly inclusive exercises can 
be used as models, including Operation Golden Phoenix, which 
involved more than 140 different partners in the summer of 2008, and 
the annual FA-Hum (Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias) disaster 
management event sponsored by SOUTHCOM, which engages more 
than twenty Central American and Caribbean nations, U.S. military 
forces, and transnational institutions. 
Transformational Aspects of STAR-TIDES and the 
Maritime Strategy 
As noted earlier, transformation involves changes in people, 
processes, organizations, and technology. Both the Maritime Strategy 
and STAR-TIDES invoke crosscutting changes among all of these 
areas. A good expression of how these linkages can work is expressed 
in the book Democratizing Innovation by Eric von Hippel, professor 
and head of the Innovation and Entrepreneurship Group at the MIT 
Sloan School of Management, in Boston, Massachusetts. The book 
describes how people participate in the development of products they 
use and explains in detail the emerging process of user-centric 
democratized innovation. Von Hippel states:24  
It is now clear that users often innovate, and that they often freely 
reveal their innovations. But what about informal cooperation among 
users? What about organized cooperation in development of 
innovations and other matters? The answer is that both flourish 
                                                     
23 http://www.shelterbox.org/home.htm. The ShelterBox Trust is a 
registered U.K. charity that provides emergency aid for victims of natural and 
other disasters anywhere in the world. Since operations began in January 2001, 
it has helped over 800,000 people and worked in more than 52 countries, 
responding to earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, wars, volcanoes, and 
so on.  
24 Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2005), 93. The book is also licensed under a Creative Commons license 
and is available as a downloadable PDF document on http://web.mit.edu/ 
evhippel/www/democ.htm. 
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among user-innovators. Informal user-to-user cooperation, such as 
assisting others to innovate, is common. Organized cooperation in 
which users interact within communities, is also common. Innovation 
communities are often stocked with useful tools and infrastructure 
that increase the speed and effectiveness with which users can 
develop and test and diffuse their innovations. 
As illustrated in the scenario analysis example, the STAR-TIDES 
innovation community can address planning issues quickly, at several 
levels, in ways that can improve the abilities of the Sea Services and 
regional combatant commanders to engage complex operational 
challenges. This is especially true when the interactive tools of social 
software and Web 2.0 are brought to bear.25 Moreover, diverse groups 
can explore multiple dimensions of the interactions among people, 
processes, organization, and technology to promote innovative, 
crosscutting interactions in a number of ways. Six examples follow. 
People and Processes. The Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES 
both focus on preparing people for new types of missions in complex, 
networked environments. Both promote more integrated processes 
among governments, nongovernmental organizations, international 
organizations, indigenous entities, and others in support of “relevant 
populations.” An important part of this is to convert strategy, policy, 
and doctrine into effective field operating procedures quickly. In 
addition to learning how to write such procedures, the Sea Services 
should pursue human interoperability and organizational research to 
develop trust and build social networks before they are needed in 
crises. 
People and Organizations. A common theme of the Maritime 
Strategy and STAR-TIDES, as well as the work of the Transformation 
Chairs network, is that education is a very important, even strategic, 
investment for the United States. This is less traditional education than 
the conversion of educational approaches to promote innovative, 
adaptive thinking, and lifelong learning. In parallel, U.S. national 
security institutions, including the Sea Services, need to change their 
cultures to emphasize experience with complex operations when 
selecting people for leadership positions and promoting them. This 
                                                     
25 See, for example, Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II, “Social Software 
and National Security, a ‘Net Assessment,’” Defense and Technology Paper 
61 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, 2009). 
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typically requires that lessons from real-world activities be learned and 
converted quickly into changed organizational and individual behavior.  
People and Technology. Technological solutions for complex 
operations must be affordable, implementable, and sustainable by 
indigenous, “relevant populations” in their worlds—not just by U.S. or 
coalition forces or aid organizations. Initiatives such as the Global 
Maritime Partnership recognize this as they work to engage the world’s 
navies and coast guards, often in their waters, and help develop their 
capabilities. In the same vein, STAR-TIDES expressly looks for 
alternatives to expensive DOD programs of record in favor of those 
more suited to building partner capacity. In both cases, Sea Service 
personnel can benefit by thinking more broadly about how crosscutting, 
“whole systems” approaches (using different systems together) can 
increase effectiveness by integrating disparate technologies.  
Processes and Technology. Unclassified information sharing with 
civil–military mission partners beyond the boundaries of the Joint 
Force is essential to success in the kinds of operations addressed by 
both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES. This often involves 
relatively low-tech solutions, including collaboration tools that can 
work with users who have limited access to communications. This 
requires changes in traditional military communications processes that 
emphasize links within the boundaries of joint forces, rather than 
beyond them. In support of such shifts, the April 2009 DOD instruction 
on unclassified information sharing26 and the provision of Internet 
access to nongovernmental organizations on Maritime Partner station 
ships27 are important steps forward. 
Processes and Organizations. In recognition of the growing 
importance of complex operations, civilian deputies have been 
established for the four-star commanders of both the U.S. Southern and 
Africa Commands. This truly reflects transformational organizational 
change. The growing use of covenantal relationships, discussed earlier, 
will require significant shifts in organizational processes to achieve a 
balance between decentralized innovation and oversight with 
accountability. Finally, the Sea Services and the STAR-TIDES research 
                                                     
26 DODI 8220.02, “Information and Communications Technology, 
Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, 
and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations,” April 30, 2009. 
27 Naval Studies Board, Maritime Security Partnerships (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2008). 
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network should work together, along with the Center for Complex 
Operations (CCO) and others, to help partner organizations implement 
lessons learned and adjust educational curricula accordingly.28 
Profoundly innovational outcomes can result. 
Technology and Organizations. Information technology enables 
the flat, porous network of STAR-TIDES, as well as the data-based 
communities of interest that are essential for accurate maritime domain 
awareness. In turn, such awareness demands expanded intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as interagency (and 
international) information-sharing and cooperation. This is true not 
only for combat operations, counterterrorism, antipiracy, and 
counternarcotics but also for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. 
The ability to gain situational awareness rapidly and share it widely is 
the critical enabler of all other actions in these situations. What is 
transformational is that this can be achieved with relatively low-cost 
systems and distributed, federated organizations, based on responsible 
sharing and collaboration.  
Summary 
The Maritime Strategy calls for persistent engagement at all levels 
to build enduring relationships and promote understanding with 
nontraditional partners to help avoid conflict. STAR-TIDES’ 
multidisciplinary, international approaches and linking of distributed 
talent already are contributing solutions to real-world challenges. Both 
include transformational elements that cut across people, processes, 
organizations, and technology to facilitate public–private, whole-of-
government engagement to improve performance in complex 
environments. These complementary efforts can help build global 
partnerships to address the challenges of globalization, instability, and 
insecurity in the 21st century. 
                                                     
28 The Center for Complex Operations is a developing “community of 
practice” of civilian and military complex operations training and education 
institutions and practitioners (see essay 4). The CCO defines complex 
operations as consisting of counterinsurgency; stability, security, transition, 
and reconstruction operations; and irregular warfare. The authors have adopted 
a more expansive definition that includes humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief at home and abroad. 
